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Abstract
We introduce a constrained priority mechanism that combines outcome-based
matching from machine-learning with preference-based allocation schemes com-
mon in market design. Using real-world data, we illustrate how our mechanism
could be applied to the assignment of refugee families to host country locations,
and kindergarteners to schools. Our mechanism allows a planner to first specify
a threshold g for the minimum average outcome score that should be achieved by
the assignment. In the refugee matching application, this score corresponds to the
predicted probability of employment, while in the student assignment application
it corresponds to standardized test scores. The mechanism is a priority mecha-
nism that considers both outcomes and preferences by assigning agents (refugee
families, students) based on their preferences, but subject to meeting the plan-
ner’s specified threshold. The mechanism is both strategy-proof and constrained
efficient in that it always generates a matching that is not Pareto dominated by
any other matching that respects the planner’s threshold.
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1 Introduction
We introduce a priority mechanism that matches agents to locations in instances where
a planner/designer (hereafter, planner) can set a minimum acceptable threshold on her
own measure of aggregate welfare. The design of our mechanism is motivated by the
assignment of refugee families to host country locations. In this application, refugee
families have preferences over locations, and host governments would like to conduct
the assignment to take account of these preferences, but they would also like to make
sure that their own measure of social welfare is not compromised so much so that it
falls below a pre-specified threshold. In the refugee assignment problem, host country
governments may consider their measure of social welfare to be an index of predicted
integration success as measured by, for example, employment or earnings. In other
applications such as student assignment to schools, this measure of welfare could be the
average GPA of students, or their performance in standardized tests—measures that are
typically of concern to school boards.
Our mechanism is a random priority mechanism but differs from the canonical version
(e.g. Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) in the following respects. After preferences
are elicited from the agents and the agents are lined up in a random order, each successive
agent is assigned to their highest ranked location provided that assigning them to that
location meets two conditions: (i) there is an available seat at that location, and (ii)
there is a way to complete the assignment of the remaining agents that respects the
planner’s threshold. We assume that agents can rank locations strictly, except possibly
their worst ranked locations. If there is no location that an agent can rank strictly
that meets the two criteria above, then the agent is put in a “holding set” and will be
assigned to one of their worst ranked locations (over which they are indifferent) at the
end of the process. At this point, all agents in the holding set are assigned to locations
to maximize the planner’s welfare measure, and the assignment is complete.
Outcome-based matching was introduced in the context of refugee assignment to
host country resettlement locations by Bansak et al. (2018).1 The idea in outcome-
based matching is to assign agents to locations so as to maximize a social planner’s
welfare measure, for example the refugee’s expected employment success. Data-driven
algorithms train supervised learners on historical data to discover synergies between
places and types of refugees. The learned models are then used for newly arriving
refugees to predict their expected integration success and optimally match them to
locations where they have the highest probability of success subject to capacity and
other constraints. Outcome-based matching is appealing because it harnesses historical
data to maximize expected integration success and does not require collecting data on
refugee preferences.2 However, a pure outcome-based approach does not take preferences
into account and does not utilize private information that refugees may possess regarding
which location would work best for them.
1Follow-up studies include Trapp et al. (2018) and Go¨lz and Procaccia (2018).
2The Swiss government has recently implemented a randomized test to examine the performance of
data-driven algorithms for outcome-based assignment.
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Our mechanism addresses this limitation by assigning agents based on their prefer-
ences, to the extent acceptable to the planner. It draws on the strengths of both the
pure preference-based approach and the data-driven outcome-based approach, allowing
the planner to harness the power of data-driven assignment to ensure some minimum
level of welfare while taking into account the preferences of the agents. The mechanism
achieves this by integrating the data-driven matching algorithm of Bansak et al. (2018)
into a priority mechanism for preference-based matching.
Our mechanism has several desirable properties. First, it strikes a compromise be-
tween the need of the planner to ensure a minimum level for their measure of average
welfare, and the appeal of incorporating agents’ preferences.3 Second, despite the added
complexity of accounting for the planner’s constraint, our mechanism inherits the desir-
able properties of priority mechanisms. It remains strategy-proof and hence is immune to
strategic manipulation through false reporting of preferences. It is constrained Pareto-
efficient in that it generates an assignment that is not Pareto dominated by another
assignment that also satisfies the planner’s constraint. It also allows agents to express
preferences without the requirement that they strictly rank all locations. This flexibility
is important, especially in the refugee assignment application, since there may be a large
degree of heterogeneity as to whether refugees have distinct preferences over locations.
Finally, the mechanism is both computationally and administratively feasible. It can be
implemented by the planner with only minor adjustments to existing methods. It only
requires the additional step of eliciting agents’ top choices.
We provide two applications of our mechanism using data from two distinct settings.
In the first, we illustrate how our mechanism could be used to assign refugees admitted
into the United States to American cities, taking the planner’s welfare measure to the
be expected level of employment of a member of the refugee household within 90 days of
resettlement. The importance of matching refugees to host country locations as a tool
to improve integration success is discussed in Mousa (2018), and there have been many
proposals for how host countries may approach the matching problem (e.g. Moraga and
Rapoport, 2014, Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport, 2015, Delacre´taz et al., 2016,
Andersson and Ehlers, 2016, Bansak et al., 2018, Roth, 2018, Trapp et al., 2018). The
idea of refugee matching is to select locations that are likely to be a good fit for a given
refugee to thrive, and extant research has shown that the place of initial settlement has
a profound impact on the long-term integration success of refugees (A˚slund and Rooth,
2007, Damm, 2014, Bansak et al., 2018, Marte´n et al., 2019).
In practice, however, the assignment of refugees in most countries is usually deter-
mined by simple capacity constraints and/or proportional distribution keys. Govern-
ments want to ensure that refugees become self-sufficient and are typically reluctant
to let them freely choose where to settle due to concerns that this could result in a
highly uneven regional distribution and the creation of ethnic enclaves. That said, a few
governments have started to appreciate the value of eliciting the refugee families’ own
3The idea of integrating machine learning methods with the preference-based matching methods of
market design has been suggested by Milgrom and Tadelis (2018).
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preferences over locations.4 Recognizing this value, the Dutch government, for example,
has started collecting unstructured information on the location preferences of refugee
families as part of their interviews. However, there currently exists no systematic data
on refugee preferences, including in the United States. As a result, for our application,
we impute refugee preferences based on secondary migration data.
In our second application, we demonstrate how our mechanism could be applied
outside the refugee matching context. In this application, we apply the mechanism
to the task of matching kindergarteners to schools in Tennessee, taking the planner’s
welfare measure to be the sum of their reading, math, and listening scaled scores on
the Stanford Achievement Tests (SAT) for the Kindergarten level. School choice is a
canonical application for the matching literature (see, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
2003, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2009, Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 2013, Pathak, 2011,
2016, Ehlers et al., 2014) and thus serves as a useful second application to illustrate our
mechanism.
2 The Mechanism
2.1 Preliminaries
There are n agents (refugee families/school children) randomly labeled 1, ..., n, each of
which has to be assigned to a location (host country city or town/school). Let L denote
the finite set of locations. Each location l ∈ L has a capacity ql ≥ 1 as to how many
agents it can accommodate. We assume that n ≤ ∑l ql so that it is feasible to assign
all agents. For each agent i, let gi(l) be a measure of success at location l (employment
probability/test scores) when assigned to that location. This measure may be accounted
for in the agent’s preferences, but is the key consideration for a social planner. We refer
to gi(l) as the planner’s outcome score for agent i at location l.
Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference ordering %i over the set of
locations.5 Indifference and the strict preference relations are denoted ∼i and i, re-
spectively, and %= (%1, ...,%n) denotes the vector of preferences.
We make the assumption on agents’ preferences that the only indifferences are over
the worst-ranked locations. That is, apart from possibly having ties among a set of
locations that an agent deems to be the worst, each agent has a strict preference over
all of the other locations. Formally, for all agents i, if l ∼i l′ for some l′ 6= l, there is
no l′′ such that l i l′′. This still allows for an agent to be indifferent over all locations.
This assumption is motivated by our application to refugee assignment: refugee families
4For example, refugee families may possess valuable private information about which location would
be best for them.
5We assume that all agents prefer to be assigned to a location rather than be not assigned, so we
can omit non-assignment from the set of possible outcomes for each agent.
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often do not have full information on all possible locations, but they may have (strict)
preferences over a limited set of top choices.6
Define the set Si = L\{l ∈ L : ∃l′ ∼i l} which are all of the locations except any
that agent i is indifferent over. Agent i has a strict preference across all locations in Si
and if any location is left out of Si then it must have been ranked worst.
A matching µ maps the set of agents to locations. A matching µ is
1. feasible if it satisfies the capacity constraints: |µ−1(l)| ≤ ql,∀l
2. g-acceptable if the average outcome score is not lower than g: 1
n
∑
i gi(µ(i)) ≥ g.
g-acceptability reflects the idea that the planner wants the average outcome score not
to fall below a specified threshold g. The planner wants to ensure that the allocation
is such that agents have some minimum level of expected outcomes (e.g. a minimum
expected employment rate/GPA or test score).
Note that not all values of g can produce a feasible matching. Let g denote the
highest possible average outcome score that can be generated by a feasible matching:
g := max
µ
1
n
∑
i
gi(µ(i)) subject to |µ−1(l)| ≤ ql, ∀l (1)
Feasible g-acceptable matchings exist only for g ≤ g.
2.2 The Assignment Procedure
Given a value of g ≤ g, the algorithm starts with agent 1 and works down to agent n in
a sequence of n steps before completing in either the nth or an additional (n+1)th step.
At Step i ≤ n, agent i is either assigned to a location or put on hold by being added to
a set of temporarily unassigned agents that will all get assigned simultaneously at Step
n+ 1. At each Step i, let Ni denote the set of agents j < i that have been put on hold.
N1 = ∅ since at the start of the algorithm no agent is on hold.
If agent j < i was assigned a location prior to Step i, then let αi(j) denote the
location and (j, αi(j)) the assignment, viewing αi as a function. Refer to this function
as the completed assignment at Step i. Note that α1 = ∅, so the completed assignment
at Step 1 is trivial. A remaining assignment βi at Step i is a mapping of the unassigned
agents {i, ..., n} ∪Ni to locations such that
µ(αi,βi)(j) :=
{
αi(j) if j < i
βi(j) if j ∈ {i, ..., n} ∪Ni
is a matching. We refer to µ(αi,βi) as the matching associated with the pair of completed
and remaining assignments (αi, βi). The existence of these matchings will be guaranteed
recursively by the algorithm.
6We interpret this as reflecting true indifference across the worst-ranked locations. Our mechanism
would not necessarily be strategy-proof if the agents do in fact have strict preferences over these locations
but express indifference due to lack of information.
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At each Step i ≤ n, given αi define the set
Lgi (αi) = {l ∈ L : ∃ βi s.t. l = βi(i) and µ(αi,βi) is a feasible g-acceptable matching}
This is the set of locations that are not at full capacity and for which there is a way to
finish assigning all unassigned agents so as to create a feasible g-acceptable matching.
Let qil be the remaining capacity of location l after any agents ahead of i (i.e., j < i)
have been assigned in the previous i − 1 steps. At the start we have q1l = ql for all l.
It will also be convenient to define the following problems: for all Steps i = 1, ..., n+ 1,
and given a vector qi := (qil)l∈L,
Gi(q
i) := max
βi
∑
j∈{i,...,n}∪Ni
gj(βi(j)) subject to |β−1i (l)| ≤ qil ,∀l (2)
with the convention that {i, ..., n} := ∅ if i = n + 1. At each Step i, the problem in
(2) finds the remaining assignment that maximizes the total outcome score subject to
the updated capacity constraints at Step i. The solution to this problem at each step
determines whether the associated matching is g-acceptable. In fact, to verify whether
or not a location l belongs in Lgi (αi) we must first check whether the highest possible
value of the average outcome score that can be achieved under the remaining assignment
is at least g; i.e., whether
gi(l) :=
1
n
Gi+1(qi+1) + gi(l) + ∑
j<i s.t. j /∈Ni
gj(αi(j))
 ≥ g
where qi+1l′ = q
i
l′ for all l
′ 6= l and qi+1l = qil − 1. If indeed gi(l) ≥ g and qil > 0, then l
belongs to Lgi (αi); otherwise it does not. Constructing L
g
i (αi) at each Step i = 1, ..., n+1
therefore requires solving the problems given in (2). In addition, to verify whether g < g
also requires solving one of these problems since the problem in (1) equals G1(q
1)/n.
The steps of the algorithm are as follows.
Step 0. Verify that g ≤ g and proceed only if it holds.
Step i ≤ n. If Si ∩ Lgi (αi) is empty (meaning that there is no location that agent i
ranked strictly to which it could be assigned, and we can find a remaining assignment
that generates a feasible g-acceptable matching), then place agent i on hold. In this
case, set
Ni+1 = Ni ∪ {i}, αi+1 = αi, qi+1l = qil ∀l
and move on to Step i + 1. Otherwise, if Si ∩ Lgi (αi) is nonempty, then it contains a
unique best location from the perspective of agent i – i.e., a location l∗i such that l
∗
i i l
for all l ∈ Si ∩Lgi (αi). This follows from the fact that i ranks the elements of Si strictly.
Assign agent i to l∗i , and set
Ni+1 = Ni, αi+1 = αi ∪ {(i, l∗i )} , qi+1l∗i = q
i
l∗i
− 1, and qi+1l = qil ∀l 6= l∗i
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If i < n, then move to Step i+ 1. If i = n, then move to Step n+ 1 only if a agent was
ever put on hold (i.e., Nn+1 6= ∅); otherwise, stop.
Step n+1. At this stage the only unassigned agents are those that were put on hold
in Nn+1. Here, choose any remaining assignment that maximizes the average outcome
score given the completed assignment and the capacity constraints; that is, solve (2) for
i = n+ 1 and stop.
For any preference vector % satisfying our assumptions, our algorithm produces a
matching, namely µ(αs,βs), where s ∈ {n, n + 1} was the step at which the algorithm
stopped. The algorithm defines a mechanism ϕ, which, given the other parameters of
the model, is a mapping from preference vectors to feasible matchings. We refer to
the mechanism as g-constrained priority, since it is a modification of the usual priority
mechanism (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981).
At each Step i, implementation of the mechanism involves iteratively solving the
maximization problem in Equation 2 to verify that g-acceptability can still be met if
agent i were assigned to each available location in order of preference, until such a lo-
cation is found. This amounts to iteratively solving a standard linear sum assignment
problem, for which various polynomial-time algorithms exist.7 Under a worst-case sce-
nario where every agent is put on hold after unsuccessfully considering all of its strictly
ranked locations, this would require solving an equally sized maximization problem in
Equation 2 a total of n(|L| − 2) times.8
2.3 Properties of the Mechanism
Let ϕ(%) denote the matching produced by the g-constrained priority mechanism for
any preference vector % that satisfies our assumptions, and ϕ(%)(i) the location assign-
ment of agent i under this matching. By construction, the matching produced by this
mechanism is feasible and g-acceptable. In addition, the mechanism satisfies two key
properties. It is:
1. constrained efficient in the sense that for all preference vectors % that satisfy
our assumptions, ϕ(%) is not Pareto dominated by another feasible g-acceptable
matching µ. That is, it is not the case that µ(i) %i ϕ(%)(i) for all agents i, and
µ(i) i ϕ(%)(i) for some agent i.
2. strategy-proof in the sense that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy of
the induced preference reporting game. That is, for every preference vector %
7In graph theory, the assignment problem is known as a maximum weighted bipartite matching. See
the Supplemental Information (SI) for more details on how the assignment problem is featured in the
mechanism implementation.
8Note that the maximization problem would then need to be solved one final time at Step n+1 with
all of the agents. The reason the worst-case scenario features the (|L| − 2) term is that it arises when
agents have strictly ranked all but 2 locations, since it is not possible to strictly rank all but 1 location,
and if all locations have been strictly ranked then agents will not be put on hold and the maximization
problem in Equation 2 would gradually become smaller and less costly to solve at each successive Step
i.
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satisfying our assumptions, every agent i, and every alternative preference %′i that
i could report that also satisfies our assumptions, ϕ(%)(i) %i ϕ(%′i,%−i)(i).
The proof that the mechanism is constrained efficient and strategy-proof is straight-
forward, but for completeness we include it in the appendix.
One important property of the canonical priority mechanism that does not carry
over to our g-constrained priority mechanism is the property that the mechanism char-
acterizes the full set of Pareto efficient assignments. Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998)
showed that for any Pareto efficient assignment, there exists an ordering of agents under
which implementing the priority mechanism for that ordering generates that assignment.
Given this, one could ask whether for every g-constrained efficient assignment, there ex-
ists an ordering of the agents for which the g-constrained priority mechanism generates
that assignment. The answer to this question turns out to be no, as demonstrated by the
following example with two agents 1 and 2 and three locations A,B and C. The table
gives the ranking of the three locations for each agent and in parentheses the outcome
score gi(l) for each agent-location pair.
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
1 A (0.1) B (0.5) C (0.9)
2 A (0.1) C (0.5) B (0.9)
Suppose that each location has a capacity of 1 seat. If the planner’s threshold g is set
to 0.45 and agent 1 goes first, then he will be assigned to location A, and agent 2 will
be assigned to B. If agent 2 goes first then she’ll be assigned to A, and agent 1 will be
sent to C. But the possibility of sending 1 to B and 2 to C also meets the planner’s
constraint and is not Pareto dominated by any other assignment that is acceptable to
the planner.
3 Applications
To illustrate the mechanism, we apply it both to simulated data as well as two empirical
examples using real-world data from the United States that involve the assignment of
refugees to resettlement locations and the assignment of students to schools.
Our mechanism requires the planner to select a value for g, and this choice implies a
tradeoff between an outcome-based and preference-based matching. From the planner’s
perspective, it is desirable to achieve the highest possible value of g to ensure that the
agents’ outcomes are optimized. However, setting a higher value of g comes at the cost of
assigning agents to locations that are, in expectation, lower in their preference rankings.
That is, while the mechanism simultaneously considers both outcomes and preferences,
there is a tradeoff between the two, where the balance of that tradeoff changes as g
increases.
The magnitude of the tradeoff also depends upon the joint distribution of agents’
preference rankings and their outcome scores. Two measures, in particular, play an
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important role: the correlation between outcome scores and preference rankings within
agents (i.e. the degree to which an agent’s preferred locations align with the locations
where that agent would achieve their best outcomes) and the correlation between pref-
erence rankings across agents (i.e. the degree to which agents have similar preference
rankings). We demonstrate this below.
3.1 Simulation Data
We apply the mechanism to simulated data to show these properties. For simplicity, our
simulations involve assigning 100 agents to 100 locations with one seat each. For each
agent, we randomly generate a preference rank vector (with 1 indicating the most desired
location and 100 the worst) and an outcome score vector (with values in [0, 1]). The
simulations vary both the correlation between preference and outcome vectors (−0.5, 0,
and 0.5) and the correlation between preference vectors across agents (0, 0.5, and 0.8).9
This yields nine different scenarios, and in each we apply our mechanism to make the
assignment for various values of g. See the Supplemental Information (SI) for details.
3.2 Refugee Data
To illustrate how the mechanism could perform in a real-world scenario, we apply it to
data from refugees in the United States, where refugee families are the agents and reset-
tlement cities are the locations. Early employment is a core goal of the U.S. resettlement
program, which strives to quickly transition refugees into self-sufficiency after arrival.
This application illustrates how our mechanism could hypothetically be employed in
the United States to achieve a desired level of early employment while geographically
assigning refugees based on their location preferences.
Our real-world refugee data includes de-identified information on working-age refugees
(ages 18 to 64; N = 33,782) who have been resettled to the United States during the
2011-2016 period by one of the largest U.S. refugee resettlement agencies. Over this
time period, the agencies’ placement officers centrally assigned refugees to one of ap-
proximately 40 resettlement locations in the agency’s network. The data contain details
on the refugee characteristics such as age, gender, origin, and education. It also includes
the assigned resettlement location, whether the refugee was employed at 90 days after
arrival, and whether the refugee migrated from the initial location within 90 days.
We applied our mechanism to data on the refugee families who arrived in the third
quarter (Q3) of 2016, specifically focusing on refugees who were free to be assigned to
different resettlement locations (561 families), in contrast to refugees who were predes-
tined to specific locations on the basis of existing family or other ties. To generate
each family’s outcome score vector across each of the locations, we employed the same
methodology in Bansak et al. (2018), using the data for the refugees who arrived from
9The correlation between preference and outcome vectors treats higher preferences (i.e. closer to 1)
as more positive values, such that a positive correlation between preferences and outcomes indicates
more highly preferred locations are those that also result in higher outcome scores.
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2011 up to (but not including) 2016 Q3 to generate models that predict the expected
employment success of a family (i.e. the mean probability of finding employment among
working-age members of the family) at any of the locations, as a function of their back-
ground characteristics. These models were then applied to the families who arrived in
2016 Q3 to generate their predicted employment success at each location, which comprise
their outcome score vectors. See the SI and Bansak et al. (2018) for details.
Our mechanism also requires data on location preferences of refugees. To the best of
our knowledge, such data do not currently exist in the United States, where refugees are
assigned to locations by the resettlement agencies. We therefore infer revealed location
preferences from secondary migration behavior. Specifically, we use the same modeling
procedures used in the outcome score estimation, simply swapping in outmigration in
place of employment as the response variable. This allows us to predict for each refugee
family that arrived in 2016 Q3 the probability of outmigration at each location as a
function of their background characteristics. For each family, we then rank locations
such that the location with the lowest (highest) probability of outmigration is ranked
first (last). Details about the data and sample are provided in the SI.
We acknowledge that inferred location preferences from secondary migration behav-
ior are not necessarily the same as the stated location preferences that refugees would
express in an application form if given the opportunity to do so by host country gov-
ernments. That said, there are reasons to believe that the inferred location preferences
provide a useful proxy. Outmigration is a costly signal indicating that a refugee prefers
to move rather than stay in the originally assigned location. Mossad et al. (2019) pro-
vide a comprehensive analysis of the secondary migration patterns of refugees in the
United States and find that secondary migration is mostly driven by refugees relocating
in search of employment opportunities and co-ethnic communities. One of the main
channels through which these effects operate is the refugee’s nationality, which is also
an important predictor in the model that we use to infer revealed location preferences
from secondary migration.
3.3 Education Data
As a second illustration of how the mechanism could perform in a real-world scenario,
we apply it to education data from the United States, where the agents are individ-
ual students and the locations are schools. In particular, we consider data from the
Tennessee’s Student Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) project conducted by the Ten-
nessee State Department of Education (for details see Achilles et al. (2008)). These data
contain information on the choice of elementary schools for a large sample of students
as well as information on the test score performance of these students. We focus on
the Kindergarten grade level and apply our mechanism to generate new assignments of
students to schools with the goal of improving the outcomes of students as measured by
standardized tests administered at the end of Kindergarten. One could imagine a school
district setting a minimum test score that should be achieved on average.
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To generate each student’s outcome score vector across each of the schools, we em-
ploy the same methods as in the previous application to predict the expected test scores
of a student at any of the schools, as a function of their background characteristics.
The background characteristics included the students’ age, gender, and race, as well as
information on whether they are eligible for free school lunches (a proxy for socioeco-
nomic status) or special education. The test score outcome was defined as the sum of
reading, math, and listening scaled scores on the Stanford Achievement Tests (SAT) for
the Kindergarten level.
We inferred revealed school preferences of students from the observed transfers out
of the schools. Specifically, we used the same modeling procedure as for the test scores
but instead used a response variable that measured whether a student had transferred
to another school by the first, second, or third grade. Based on these models we can
then predict for each student the propensity for leaving each school as a function of their
background characteristics. For each student, we then rank schools such that the school
for which they have the lowest (highest) propensity for transferring out is ranked first
(last).
We generate these outcome score and preference vectors and apply our mechanism
to a random sample of 1,000 students from 33 schools that are observed for all grades
from Kindergarten through 3rd grade and have non-missing data for tests scores and
background characteristics. Details about the data and sample are provided in the SI.
4 Results
4.1 Simulations
Figure 1 depicts the results for assignment under the g-constrained priority mechanism
for nine different simulation scenarios that vary the correlation between preferences and
outcome scores within agents and the correlation between preferences across agents. In
addition, to model a real-world scenario in which agents can indicate only a limited
number of top locations in an application form, the preference vectors are truncated
such that only the top 10 ranks are retained and indifference is established among the
remaining location. The top panel shows the proportion of agents who were assigned to
one of their top three locations given various levels of g, the threshold for the minimum
average outcome score. The bottom panel shows the mean outcome score for agents in
their assigned locations for the same levels of g. The curves end once g has been reached
and hence no feasible assignment is possible.
There is a clear tradeoff between realized preference ranks and outcome scores in all
simulations. As g is increased, the realized mean outcome score eventually increases.
This is a mechanical result of increasing g and hence enforcing the requirement for
a higher mean outcome value. Simultaneously, as soon as the mean outcome score
is impacted, the proportion of agents assigned to one of their preferred locations also
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begins to decrease. This occurs because enforcing the requirement for a higher value of
g requires the mechanism to deviate from the preference-based optimization.
Figure 1 also shows how the immediacy and severity of the tradeoff can vary substan-
tially depending upon the joint distribution of preferences and outcome scores.10 First,
focusing on the top panel, we see that the higher the correlation between agents’ prefer-
ences, the worse is the achievable baseline proportion of agents that can be assigned to
one of their top locations at the lowest values of g. This result, which holds regardless
of the correlation between preferences and outcome scores, is intuitive: the more simi-
lar are different agents’ preferences, the more rivalrous is the matching procedure, and
hence the more difficult it is to match agents to one of their top-ranked locations given
limited capacity in each location.
Second, the more positive the correlation between preferences and outcome scores,
the less severe is the tradeoff in the sense that the tradeoff does not kick in until higher
levels of g are enforced. The intuition for this result is that if preferences and outcomes
are positively correlated, then matching based on preferences should indirectly also lead
to outcome-based matching, and hence deviation from the preference-based solution
will not occur until a higher level of g is reached. This is a useful finding from the
standpoint of a real-world implementation of the mechanism. If, in advance of their
preference reporting, agents were given information on their predicted outcomes in each
location, they could incorporate such information into their preference determination. If
this results in a closer alignment of preferences and outcomes, that would help alleviate
the tradeoff in the mechanism.
Third, turning to the bottom panel in Figure 1, we see that once the tradeoff kicks
in, the realized mean outcome curves trace closely along the identity line; that is, upon
enforcing a level of g that deviates from the preference-based assignment, the mechanism
will find an alternative assignment that optimizes for preferences subject to just barely
satisfying the g constraint. The realized mean outcome results also mirror the trends on
realized preference ranks: The more positive is the correlation between preference and
outcome vectors, the later the tradeoff kicks in.
Fourth, we see that given a negative correlation between preferences and outcome
scores, the correlation across preference vectors has a significant impact on how the trade-
off affects the realized mean outcome score, with the tradeoff being more severe with a
low correlation across preference vectors. This result can be explained as follows. A neg-
ative correlation between preference and outcome vectors implies that preference-based
assignment is counter to the goal of optimizing for realized outcome scores. However, if
there is also a positive correlation across agents’ preferences, that means that different
kinds of agents generally prefer the same locations, and hence also that the locations
that result in low outcome scores are also similar across agents, thus limiting the degree
to which matching based on preferences will actually hurt realized outcome scores on
average. If, in contrast, there is no correlation across preferences, then there is greater
10It can also depend on the number of seats available in each location and the extent to which each
location contributes to the correlations.
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Figure 1: Results from applying our g-Constrained Priority Mechanism to simulated
data that varies the correlations between preference and outcome score vectors and the
correlations between preference vectors across agents. Upper panel shows the average
probability that a agent was assigned to one of its top three locations. Lower panel
shows the realized average outcome score. N=100.
latitude for the mechanism to assign agents to their higher-ranked locations, which also
happen to be the locations that are the worst for their outcome scores. As the cor-
relation between preference and outcome vectors becomes more positive, this dynamic
begins to disappear. However, the reason it does not reverse in the bottom-right panel
of Figure 1 is due to the existence of trailing indifferences in the preference rank vec-
tors, which means the agents who could not be matched to one of their strictly ranked
locations are assigned using outcome-based optimization, thereby limiting the effect of
the phenomenon described above.11
11The SI includes the results of the same simulations without truncating the preference rank vectors.
In that case, we do see the expected reversal across the lower three panels.
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Figure 2: Shows the distribution of pairwise correlations between refugee family loca-
tion preferences, integration outcomes (i.e. employment), and preferences and outcomes.
N=561 refugee families who arrived in the United States in Q3 of 2016.
4.2 Application Using Refugee Data
Figure 2 shows features of the joint distribution of the refugee families’ outcome score
and preference rank vectors. The top panel pertains to the correlation between the
families’ outcome and preference vectors. For each family, a correlation is computed
between its two vectors, and the panel displays the distribution of those correlations. The
distribution is roughly centered around zero (the mean correlation is 0.03). This suggests
a relatively limited relationship between the locations refugees prefer and those where
they would actually achieve better employment outcomes. This is an interesting finding
and also has a key policy implication. Providing refugees with information on which
locations are beneficial for their employment outcomes would allow them to formulate
more informed preferences. If this results in a closer correlation between preference
and outcome vectors, this would help strengthen our mechanism since a more positive
correlation alleviates the tradeoff between outcome- and preference-based matching.
The middle panel in Figure 2 shows the distribution of pairwise correlations between
families’ preference vectors. The correlations are mostly highly positive, with a mean
correlation of 0.67. This shows that preference vectors are relatively similar across the
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families; many refugees would more or less prefer to be placed in similar locations. Given
the existence of location capacity constraints, this is an inconvenient finding from the
standpoint of preference-based assignment.
The bottom panel in Figure 3 shows the distribution of all pairwise correlations
between families’ outcome vectors. As can be seen, the correlations are overwhelmingly
positive (with a mean correlation of 0.75), highlighting the fact already shown elsewhere
(Bansak et al., 2018) that certain locations are generally better than other locations for
helping refugees to achieve positive employment outcomes. However, the fact that there
still is meaningful variation across different families’ outcome score vectors indicates that
certain locations do indeed make a better match for different refugee families, depending
on their personal characteristics, which is the foundation for the outcome-optimization
matching procedure introduced by Bansak et al. (2018).
In applying our mechanism to the 2016 Q3 refugee data, we impose real-world assign-
ment constraints, giving each location capacity for the same number of families as were
sent to those locations in actuality. We also truncate each family’s preference vectors
such that only the first 10 ranks are retained and indifference is established among the
remaining locations.
Figure 3 displays the results of applying our mechanism. As before, the mechanism
is applied at various levels of g, which is denoted by the x-axis. The y-axis of the
top panel denotes the proportion of cases assigned to one of their top three locations,
while the y-axis in the bottom panel denotes the mean realized outcome score, i.e. the
average predicted probability of employment, based on the assignment. The two dashed
vertical lines highlight the tradeoff interval, where altering the value of g impacts both
preferences and outcomes, and the interval ends when g is raised above g.
Given a predominantly preference-based assignment (i.e. setting g to any value below
the value at which the tradeoff interval begins), a mean outcome score of 0.41 is achieved,
meaning the predicted average employment rate is 41%.12 Under this assignment, about
25% of refugee families are assigned to a location that is among their top three choices.
For comparison, the average observed employment rate for families at their actual loca-
tions without applying any mechanism was 34%. This suggests that there are significant
synergies between refugees and locations in the sense that certain locations are a better
match for different refugees, depending on their personal characteristics. Even under a
predominantly preference-based assignment, the mechanism can therefore increase the
predicted average employment rate to 41%, about a 20 percent increase over the mean
employment rate observed without applying any mechanism.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a purely outcome-driven optimization would
yield the highest feasible g (g), which is just below 0.52, i.e. a predicted average em-
12Setting g to a value below the tradeoff interval does not result in a purely preference-based assign-
ment given the trailing indifferences in the preference rank vectors. We also applied the mechanism
to the same data without truncating the preference vectors. The result is a purely preference-based
assignment at the lowest values of g, which yields a mean outcome score of 0.37. See the SI.
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Figure 3: Results of applying the g-Constrained Priority Mechanism to refugee families
in the United States for various specified thresholds for the expected minimum level
of average integration outcomes (g). Upper panel shows the average probability that
a refugee family got assigned to one of their top three locations. Lower panel shows
the realized average integration outcomes, i.e. the average projected probability of
employment. N=561 families who arrived in Q3 of 2016.
ployment rate of 52%.13 This amounts to about a 53 percent increase over the mean
employment rate observed without applying any mechanism. Therefore, if all the gov-
ernment cared about for the assignment was to maximize the score it could attain a
considerably higher predicted employment rate by enforcing the highest feasible g. Yet,
at the highest feasible g, only 15% of refugee families would be assigned to one of their
top three locations. The preference curve in the top panel features a gradient that more
gradually steepens, with the tradeoff becoming increasingly more severe as g is increased.
13The fact that it is not possible to raise g even further is, of course, the result of the full distribution
of the refugee families’ outcome vectors, namely the fact that they feature a large positive correlation
with one another.
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4.3 Application Using Education Data
We now turn to the results for the application of the mechanism to the education data
from Tennessee where we assigned students to elementary schools to optimize on test
scores and students’ preferences over schools.
Figure 4 shows features of the joint distribution of the students’ outcome score and
preference rank vectors. The top panel pertains to the correlation between the students’
outcome and preference vectors. We see that for most students the correlations are
modest but positive with a mean of 0.12, indicating that the students slightly prefer
schools where they are predicted to have higher test scores. As mentioned earlier, a
positive correlation between preference and outcome vectors somewhat alleviates the
tradeoff between outcome- and preference-based matching. That said, as shown in the
middle panel in Figure 4, the distribution of pairwise correlations between students’
preference vectors are tightly clustered around a high positive mean correlation of 0.90.
This shows that students mostly prefer to be placed in similar schools, which makes the
preference-based matching assignment more rivalrous given a fixed number of seats in
the preferred schools. As shown in the bottom panel in Figure 4 we also find that the
pairwise correlations between students’ outcome vectors are almost all positive (with a
mean correlation of 0.79), which suggests that certain schools are generally better than
other schools for students to achieve higher test scores.
In applying our mechanism to these education data, we impose the same real-world
assignment constraints as before, giving each school capacity for the same number of
students as were enrolled in those schools in actuality. We also truncate each student’s
preference vectors such that only the first 10 ranks are retained and indifference is
established among the remaining schools in order to mimic a situation on an application
form where students can rank only the top ten preferred schools.
Figure 5 displays the results of applying our mechanism. As before, the mechanism
is applied at various levels of g, which is denoted by the x-axis. The y-axis of the
top panel denotes the proportion of students assigned to one of their top three schools,
while the y-axis in the bottom panel denotes the mean realized outcome score, i.e. the
average predicted test score, based on the assignment. The two dashed vertical lines
highlight the tradeoff interval, where altering the value of g impacts both preferences
and outcomes, and the interval ends when g is raised above g.
Given a predominantly preference-based assignment (i.e. setting g to any value below
the value at which the tradeoff interval begins), a mean predicted test score outcome of
1502 is achieved. Under this assignment, about 44% of students are assigned to a school
that is among their top three choices.14 For comparison, the average observed test score
for the students at their actual locations without applying the mechanism was 1492 with
a standard deviation of 88. This suggests that, as with the refugee data above, there
14Note that this fraction is not directly comparable to the refugee example above since there are a
different number of persons, locations, and seats per location.
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Figure 4: Shows the distribution of pairwise correlations between student preferences
over elementary schools, test score outcomes, and preferences and outcomes. N=1000
randomly sampled students from Tennessee Project Star data.
are significant synergies between students and schools in the sense that certain schools
are a better match for different students, depending on their personal characteristics.
Even under a predominantly preference-based assignment, the mechanism can therefore
increase the predicted average test score to 1502, a meaningful improvement of about a
ninth of a standard deviation in test scores compared to the observed mean under the
actual assignments.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a purely outcome-driven optimization would
yield the highest feasible g (g), which is a mean predicted test score outcome of 1519.
A fully outcome-based matching of students to schools can therefore result in a sizable
increase in the predicted average test score of about a third of a standard deviation in
test scores compared to the observed mean under the actual assignments. Given the
tradeoff between preference-based and outcome-based matching, this means that under
a purely outcome-driven optimization only about 10% of students would be assigned to
a school that is among their top three choices. This highlights that compared to the
refugee application, the tradeoff in this education example is somewhat more severe,
which is expected given that the preferences are more concentrated on similar schools
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Figure 5: Results of applying the g-Constrained Priority Mechanism to student assign-
ment to elementary schools for various specified thresholds for the expected minimum
level of average test score outcomes (g). Upper panel shows the average probability that
a student got assigned to one of their top three schools. Lower panel shows the realized
average test score outcomes, i.e. the average projected SAT score. N=1000 randomly
sampled students from Tennessee Project Star data.
even though there is a somewhat more positive correlation between preferences and
outcomes.
5 Other Mechanisms
As we have shown, the priority mechanism is a mechanism for which we can add a welfare
constraint without compromising important properties such as strategy-proofness and
(constrained) efficiency. One could ask whether we can amend other existing mechanisms
to take into account the same constraint while retaining their desirable properties, and
whether these might produce better assignments according to other welfare metrics,
e.g. the percent of agents that receive one of their top-3 locations.
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Top Trading Cycles. One candidate for an alternative mechanism, among matching
mechanisms with one-sided preferences, is Gale’s Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism
(Shapley and Scarf, 1974, Roth, 1982), which has already been employed in previous
proposals for refugee matching (Delacre´taz et al., 2016). However, adding a planner’s
g constraint to this mechanism while retaining the feature that it is strategy-proof and
constrained efficient is not straightforward.
Consider, for example, the simple adjustment of this mechanism that begins by
provisionally assigning agents to locations to maximize the planner’s objective, and
removes cycles until the planner’s welfare measure falls below the threshold, at which
point it stops and everyone that is unassigned receives the assignment that they currently
provisionally have. The following three person-three location example shows that this
mechanism is not strategy-proof. The agents are 1, 2, 3 and locations are A, B, C.
To maximize the average outcomes score, agent 1 is provisionally assigned to A, 2 to
B, and 3 to C. Preferences over locations are given on the left. In the middle, we have
the values of gi(l). Under truthful reporting agent 1 points to B, and 2 and 3 point to
A. The only cycle is between 1 and 2. However, if the planner’s threshold g is set to
0.5, then swapping 1 and 2’s locations guarantees an average outcome score below this
threshold. The algorithm would terminate with the outcome maximizing assignment
being assigned. However, agent 1 could do better by misreporting and pointing to C
instead. In this case, the assignment would be 1 to C, 2 to B, and 3 to A, which gives
an average outcome score above the threshold.
Thus, while it may be possible to incorporate an outcome constraint into the TTC
mechanism that preserves strategy-proofness and constrained efficiency, it appears that
there is no straightforward way to do so. For the priority mechanism, however, incorpo-
rating this constraint is both straightforward and computationally tractable.
Two-Sided Mechanisms. Finally, we could also consider matching mechanisms with
two-sided preferences such as the deferred acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley,
1962) where we incorporate the planner’s welfare objective into the preferences for the
locations. Here, there are at least two possibilities. First, we could assume that locations
care about maximizing the planner’s welfare score, along with other considerations; that
is, we allow the locations to express their genuine preferences. At least for the refugee
assignment application, this appears to be politically challenging, partly because policy-
makers are concerned that this could result in political problems where some locations
might discriminate against refugees from certain groups/nationalities. The second pos-
sibility is we assume that each location simply wants to maximize the average outcome
20
score among agents assigned to it. This creates competition among locations. Again, at
least in the refugee assignment application, it is not clear why the planner (national gov-
ernment) would want to allow this, i.e. it is not clear what this assignment mechanism
would achieve that serial priority does not, given the objectives of the planner.
Re-ordering the Agents. An additional exercise that helps us explore how well our
constrained priority mechanism can be expected to do in terms of alternative welfare
measures, such as the fraction of agents that receive one of their top-3 locations, is to
take a random sampling of the different possible reordering of agents and study the
variation generated in this welfare measure.
We re-ran a subset of the nine simulation scenarios considered in Section 4.1, gener-
ating the data using identical procedures and employing the same parameters (number
of agents, number of locations, size of indifference sets, levels of g). However, at each
level of g considered in each scenario, we apply the mechanism to the simulated data 100
separate times where the order of the agents is re-randomized each time. The results
are shown in Figure S3 in the SI. With respect to the proportion assigned to a top-3
location, the difference between the maximum and minimum ranges from 0.05 to 0.18
with a median difference of 0.13.15 Thus, reordering produces a typical improvement
on this welfare metric (percent of families getting one of their top 3 locations) over the
typical draw by only 6.5 percentage points.
One limitation of this exercise, however, is because the g-constrained priority mech-
anism does not characterize the set of constrained Pareto efficient assignments (as we
showed by example in Section 2.3), we do not know if there are constrained efficient as-
signments that yield improvements even beyond the ones we can generate by re-ordering
the families and applying our mechanism. However, we also do not know if there is
a strategy-proof constrained-efficient mechanism that picks out even just the “best as-
signment” (according to this welfare measure) that can be generated by re-ordering the
agents under our constrained priority mechanism—let alone an assignment that cannot
be generated by re-ordering. It is obvious that the mechanism defined by successively
re-ordering and then selecting the “best assignment” does not define a strategy-proof
mechanism. If the planner is willing to sacrifice strategy-proofness, she could attempt to
target the best assignment that could be generated using our constrained priority mech-
anism by successively re-ordering the agents. But by implementing such a non-strategy-
proof approach, agents may be incentivized to falsify their preferences and hence the
best assignment(s) the planner is trying to target may no longer even be generated.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed an assignment mechanism for contexts where there is a social plan-
ner/designer with their own welfare objective. Our mechanism strikes a compromise
15With respect to the mean outcome score, the difference between the maximum and minimum ranges
from 0.00 to 0.06 with a median difference of 0.04.
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between maximizing the planner’s objective and conducting the assignment solely on
the basis of the agents’ preferences. The mechanism is strategy-proof, constrained effi-
cient, and does not require agents to rank all locations. In real-world implementations
of our mechanism, a planner could either fix a feasible value of g in advance or review
the projected results along a sequence of g values (as in Figure 3) and choose the final
preferred assignment according to their own criteria.
We applied our mechanism to refugee assignment and school choice data to demon-
strate how it could be implemented. Refugee matching has become a prominent policy
innovation proposed to help facilitate the successful integration of refugees into host
countries’ economies and societies. However, there is disagreement over whether inte-
gration is best served by matching on refugee preferences or expected integration out-
comes. Our study highlights the value for governments to collect preference information
from refugees to provide them with agency and improve allocations by harnessing the
value of private information they possess over which locations work best for them. In
addition, our mechanism is applicable to other domains that involve the assignment of
agents to different types of locations (or more generally speaking, one-to-one and many-
to-one bipartite matching problems). As a second example, we apply our mechanism
to the assignment of kindergarteners to schools. School choice has been a longstanding
application of market design, and our illustration demonstrates how our mechanism can
be applied to this canonical setting.
In addition, our investigation resulted in interesting new theoretical insights. First,
we discovered that the priority mechanism appears to be unique in the sense that our
outcome constraint can be incorporated into it in a straightforward manner without
sacrificing the important properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and computational
tractability. In contrast, the simple modifications of the top trading cycle that we
considered to incorporate an outcome constraint did not retain strategy-proofness and/or
computational tractability. Future research might consider other modifications that
retain these properties. Second, we also discovered that not all of the canonical properties
of the priority mechanism are inherited by our constrained version. Namely, the g-
constrained priority mechanism does not characterize the full set of constrained efficient
assignments.
More broadly, these applications of our mechanism provide examples of how predic-
tive analytics from machine learning can be fruitfully combined with the preference-based
allocation schemes common in market design. The marriage of these two approaches can
provide a powerful tool to improve allocations in a way that incorporates information
about what people want while harnessing the statistical learnings from the historical
data about what would be the best options. Given the heterogeneity in information
levels and the richness of historical data on outcomes, we envision that such a combined
approach could lead to better allocations in a variety of settings compared to schemes
that rely only on preferences or only on expected outcomes.
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Supplemental Information (SI)
Combining Outcome-Based and Preference-Based
Matching: The g-Constrained Priority Mechanism
Avidit Acharya, Kirk Bansak, Jens Hainmueller
A Proof of Mechanism’s Properties
Constrained efficient Suppose that ϕ is not g-constrained efficient, so that for some
preference profile %, ϕ(%) is Pareto-dominated by a feasible g-acceptable matching µ.
For all families i, let Mi = {j < i : j /∈ Ni} be the families ahead of i that were
already assigned a location under ϕ(%), and let i = min{i : µ(i) i ϕ(%)(i)} be the
first family to which µ assigns it a location that it strictly prefers to the one it gets
under ϕ(%). (Such a family must exist if µ Pareto-dominates ϕ(%).) By construction
µ(i) = ϕ(%)(i) for all i ∈ Mi. So for µ to be feasible and g-acceptable, it must be that
µ(i) ∈ Si ∩ Lgi (αi), where αi is the completed assignment under ϕ(%) at Step i. This
means that Si ∩ Lgi (αi) 6= ∅ so ϕ(%) must have assigned the best location l∗i in this set
to family i. But since µ(i) i ϕ(%)(i) = l∗i , this contradicts the assumption that l∗i is
the best location for i in Si ∩ Lgi (αi).
Strategy-proof Suppose that there is some i for whom reporting a different preference
%′i produces a strictly better location assignment: ϕ(%′i,%−i) i ϕ(%)(i).
Let l′i = ϕ(%′i,%−i) and note that Sj∩Lgj (αj) is independent of i’s reported preference
for all j < i. Therefore, Ni = N
′
i where Ni is the set of families on hold at Step i
under the truthfully reported profile % and N ′i are those on hold at Step i under the
profile (%′i,%−i). In addition, ϕ(%′i,%−i)(j) = ϕ(%)(j) for all j ∈ Ni. This implies
that α′i = αi, where α
′
i is the completed assignment at Step i under preference profile
(%′i,%−i) and αi is the completed assignment at Step i under preference profile %.
Therefore, Lgi (αi) = L
g
i (α
′
i) =: L
g
i .
Let S ′i be the locations that i ranks strictly under %′i and Si the locations that i
ranks strictly under %i. If Si ∩ Lgi = ∅, then all of the locations in Lgi are ones that i
ranks worst, and i is guaranteed to be assigned one of these locations regardless of which
location i reports. Therefore it cannot be that ϕ(%′i,%−i) i ϕ(%)(i).
On the other hand, if Si ∩ Lgi 6= ∅ then ϕ(%′i,%−i) i ϕ(%)(i) and Lgi (αi) = Lgi (α′i)
implies that l′i ∈ Si ∩ Li(αi). But then l′i i ϕ(%)(i) = l∗i contradicts the fact that l∗i is
the unique best location in Si ∩ Li(αi) under preference %i.
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B Verifying g-Acceptability
As described in the main text, implementing the g-constrained priority mechanism in-
volves iteratively verifying that the next assignment of a family to a particular location
can be performed without compromising the possibility of a g-acceptable final matching.
This process requires solving the maximization problem in Equation 2 of the main text:
Gi(q
i) := max
βi
∑
j∈{i,...,n}∪Ni
gj(βi(j)) subject to |β−1i (l)| ≤ qil ,∀l (2)
This involves computing the maximum possible total outcome score for any remaining
set of units and the remaining location capacities.
In implementing the mechanism, Equation 2 can be solved by employing a standard
linear sum assignment problem (LSAP) (Burkard et al., revised reprint, 2012). Specifi-
cally, the LSAP formulation is applied to an augmented cost matrix, whereby the rows
correspond to the remaining units and the columns correspond to location capacity slots
(i.e. each column is replicated according to the number of capacity slots belonging to
the associated location). Each element [i, v] of the cost matrix corresponds to the com-
plement of the outcome score for the ith unit when assigned to the location to which
the vth column pertains.
Various polynomial-time algorithms have been developed for solving the LSAP, be-
ginning with the introduction of the Hungarian algorithm in the 1950s (Kuhn, 1955,
Munkres, 1957). We employ the RELAX-IV cost flow solver developed by Bertsekas
and Tseng (Bertsekas and Tseng, 1994) and implemented in R by the optmatch package
(Hansen and Klopfer, 2006).
C Simulation Application: Additional Details
The follow describes the data-generating process employed in the simulations.
First a number N is chosen, denoting the number of agents. For simplicity, the same
number of locations is also used, each with capacity for one agent. In addition, ρp and
ρop are both chosen, denoting the pre-specified correlation between preferences across
agents and the correlation between preferences and outcome scores within agents.
Next, N different N -dimensional latent variable vectors are generated, and these
vectors are column-bound into an N x N matrix, which we denote by P, representing a
simulated preference matrix. Specifically, each vector is a multivariate normal random
vector, using a mean vector of 0, and a covariance matrix with 1 for all the diagonal
elements and ρp for all the off-diagonal elements. Let ~zl denote the lth N -dimensional
latent variable vector, which pertains to the lth location and comprises the lth column
of P. For any given vector, the ith element pertains to the ith family.
By generating the N x N matrix P in this way, each row represents a cleint and each
column represents a location. Thus, the ith row, P[i,], denotes a latent preference vector
for agent i, with higher (more positive) values corresponding to a higher preference and
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vice versa. By construction, for any two cleints (rows), the pairwise correlation between
the two vectors will be ρp in expectation, imposing a correlation of ρp across agents’
preferences over locations.
Let ~si denote the ith cleint’s outcome score vector. The outcome score vectors are
constructed such that ~si = sign(ρop) · (P[i, ] + ~), where the elements of ~ are indepen-
dently distributed normal with mean 0 and variance σ2 . The value of σ
2
 is determined
such that it, in combination with the sign(ρop) operator, produces an expected pairwise
correlation of ρop between ~si and P [i, ], thereby inducing the correlation of ρop between a
agent’s preferences and outcome scores. The outcome score vectors are then row-bound
to create an N x N outcome score matrix S, where each row represents a agent and each
column represents a location.
In applying our mechanism to the simulated data, the S matrix is first normalized
such that its elements are in the interval [0, 1], and the P matrix is mapped to preference
ranks (i.e. each row P[i, ] is transformed into ranks such that the most positive value
becomes 1 and the most negative value becomes N).
For simplicity, the simulations presented in the study employ N = 100 (i.e. 100
agents assigned to 100 locations each with one seat). In addition, to mimic reality, in
which agents are likely to be able to report only a limited number of location preferences,
the preference vectors for each agent are truncated such that only the top 10 ranks are
retained and indifference is established among the remaining locations. The simulations
vary both the correlation between preference and outcome vectors (three values of ρop:
-0.5, 0, and 0.5) and the correlation between preference vectors across agents (three
values of ρp: 0, 0.5, and 0.8). This yields nine different scenarios, and in each we apply
our mechanism to make the assignment for various values of g. Figure 1 in the main
text displays the results.
In addition, Figure S1 in this SI shows the results of the same simulations when the
preference rank vectors are not truncated.
D U.S. Refugee Application
D.1 Background Information on U.S. Resettlement
Resettled refugees in the United States are assigned to locations based on collaboration
between the Department of State and nine voluntary resettlement agencies. During
a regular draft, refugees are first allocated to one of the nine agencies according to
specific quotas. Agencies are then responsible for assigning refugees to locations within
their networks. Typically refugees are assigned as cases, where a case is a family. The
assignment varies based on whether the refugee has family ties in the United States.
Refugees with ties are placed at the location most proximate to the tie. Refugees without
such ties, so-called “free cases,” are assigned on a case-by-case basis and can be assigned
to any location in the network. Placement officers consider special characteristics of
the case (nationality, case structure, medical needs) and consult with the local offices
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on whether they can accommodate a case (e.g. some offices may lack interpreters for
particular languages). Among the offices that can accommodate a case, the case is
then typically assigned to offices with the smallest proportion of their yearly capacity
currently filled. Note that a different process applies to refugees with Special Immigrant
Visas (SIVs).
Once a refugee case has been assigned, the local office then provides placement and
reception services for 90 days beginning after arrival as mandated by the U.S. Resettle-
ment Program. The duration is 180 days for refugees assigned to the matching grant
program. Agencies are mandated to report employment outcomes to the Department
of State after the conclusion of the placement and reception period. If a refugee leaves
the area before the placement and reception period ends, they may no longer receive the
benefits associated with the placement and reception service.
D.2 Registry Data
Our data includes all refugees that were resettled by one of the largest resettlement
agencies and arrived between quarter 1, 2011 and quarter 3, 2016. The same data is
used in Bansak et al. (2018). We restrict the sample to those aged between 18 and
64 years at the time of arrival (i.e. working age). We also remove a small number of
duplicates and locations that have had less than 200 refugees assigned to them over the
entire period. In the final data there are 33,782 refugees from 22,144 cases. Of those,
9,506 refugees are from free cases.
Table S1 shows the descriptive statistics for our sample. Below is a list of variables
and measures used:
• Male: Binary variable coded as 1 for males and 0 for females.
• Speaks English: Binary variable coded as 1 for refugees who speak English at the
time of arrival and 0 otherwise.
• Age at arrival : Age at arrival measured in years.
• Education: Highest level of educational attainment at arrival. Categories include:
None/Unknown, Less than Secondary, Secondary, Advanced, and University.
• Country of origin: Country of origin or nationality.
• Employed : Binary variable coded as 1 for refugees who are employed at 90 days
after arrival, and 0 otherwise.
• Year of arrival : Year of arrival (continuous).
• Month of arrival : Month of arrival (continuous).
• Free case: Binary variable coded as 1 for refugees who are free cases with no U.S.
ties, and 0 otherwise.
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D.3 Applying the Mechanism
We applied our mechanism to the data on the refugee families who arrived in the third
quarter (Q3) of 2016, specifically focusing on refugees who were free to be assigned to
different resettlement locations (561 families, 919 working-age individuals). To generate
each family’s outcome score vector across each of the locations, we employed the same
methodology in Bansak et al. (2018), using the data for the refugees who arrived from
2011 up to (but not including) 2016 Q3 to train gradient boosted tree models that
predict the expected employment success of a family (i.e. the mean probability of finding
employment among working-age members of the family) at any of the locations, as a
function of their background characteristics. These models were then applied to the
families who arrived in 2016 Q3 to generate their predicted employment success at each
location, which comprise their outcome score vectors.
To generate preference rank vectors, we infer revealed location preferences from sec-
ondary migration behavior. Specifically, we use the same modeling procedures used in
the outcome score estimation, simply swapping in outmigration in place of employment
as the response variable. This allows us to predict for each refugee family that arrived
in 2016 Q3 the probability of outmigration at each location as a function of their back-
ground characteristics. For each family, we then rank locations such that the location
with the lowest (highest) probability of outmigration is ranked first (last).
In applying our mechanism to the 2016 Q3 refugee data, we impose real-world assign-
ment constraints, giving each location capacity for the same number of families as were
sent to those locations in actuality. We also truncate each family’s preference rank vector
such that only the first 10 ranks are retained and indifference is established among the
remaining locations. Figures 2 and 3 in the main text displays the results. In addition,
Figures S2 in this SI show the results of the same simulations when the preference rank
vectors are not truncated.
More details on the procedures used to generate the outcome score and preference
rank vectors can be found below.
D.4 Generating Outcome Scores and Preference Ranks
The methods used for estimating the predicted probabilities of employment and out-
migration in this study are the same as those employed in Bansak et al. (2018). The
following material describes the procedures and is modified directly from the Supple-
mentary Materials document of Bansak et al. (2018).
D.5 Training vs. Prediction Data Designation
Let T (training data) be the matrix of refugee data, in which the unit of observation is
a single refugee, that will be used for model training. The T matrix contains the data
for all working age refugees in our data who arrived starting in 2011 and up to (but not
including) the third quarter of 2016. For each refugee we observe her assigned location,
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response variables of interest (employment for the outcome score and outmigration for
the preference rank), and her full set of covariates.
Let R (prediction data) be the matrix of data for the working age, free case refugees
who arrived during the third quarter of 2016. This comprises the set of refugees to
whom we applied our mechanism in this application. In a real-world application, these
R matrix data would correspond to new refugee arrivals and must include the same
set of covariates as in the model training data. In contrast to the model training data,
however, these prediction data need not include refugees’ response variables. In fact, in
a real-world prospective implementation of the mechanism, refugees belonging to these
prediction data will not have yet been assigned to a resettlement location.
Note that when applying our mechanism both the model training and prediction
data should be subsetted to the group of refugees for whom the outcomes of interest are
relevant. In our application the integration outcome is employment and therefore the
population of interest is working-age refugees. In addition, the prediction data should
be subsetted only to those refugees who are free to be assigned to different resettlement
locations—in contrast to refugees with predetermined geographic destinations due to
family ties and other special circumstances—as this is the subset for whom the mech-
anism is designed to help with the assignment process. That said, the model training
data need not be restricted to only free cases. Free-case and non-free-case refugees might
be sufficiently dissimilar that forecasting free-case refugees’ outcomes with models built
using non-free-case data may seem problematic. This issue is addressed, however, by
including case type as a predictor variable in the model building process (see below).
D.6 Modeling
The training data is used to build a bundle of learners that predict refugees’ probabilities
of the response variables (employment and outmigration), and those learned models are
then applied to the prediction data to generate their predicted probabilities.
The modeling is implemented on a location-by-location basis. For each resettlement
location, the training data are first subsetted to those refugees who were assigned to that
location, and a statistical model is then fit that uses those refugees’ characteristics to
predict the response. That fitted model is then applied to the prediction data (2016 Q3
refugees) to predict the probability of the response for these refugee arrivals if they were
hypothetically sent to the location in question. This process is performed separately for
each individual location, which yields for each refugee in the prediction data a vector of
predicted probabilities, one for each location. Collectively for all refugees in the predic-
tion data, the final result is then a matrix of predicted probabilities (M matrix) with
rows representing individual refugees and columns representing resettlement locations.
Note that there are two M matrices: one for probabilities of employment and one for
probabilities of outmigration.
More formally, for each refugee r = 1, ..., nT , let the response of interest (e.g. employ-
ment) be denoted by yr ∈ {0, 1} and the location assignment denoted by wr ∈ {1, ..., k},
for a total of k possible resettlement locations. Let ~xr denote a p-dimensional feature
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vector comprised of the characteristics of refugee r, and xrm denote the mth feature
in ~xr, where m = 1, ..., p. The goal of the modeling process is to learn the function
θl(~xr) = P (yr = 1|~xr, wr = l). The following describes the steps in the modeling stage.
1. Designate the historical model training data and denote it by the matrix T:
T =

y1 w1 x11 · · · x1m · · · x1p
...
...
...
...
...
yr wr xr1 · · · xrm · · · xrp
...
...
...
...
...
ynT wnT xnT 1 · · · xnTm · · · xnT p

2. Train a set of k models, Θ = {θˆ1(~xr), ..., θˆl(~xr), ..., θˆk(~xr)} as follows.
For l = 1, ..., k:
(a) Subset T to refugees for whom wr = l (i.e. refugees assigned to l-th location),
and call this Tl:
Tl =

y1 x11 · · · x1m · · · x1p
...
...
...
...
yr xr1 · · · xrm · · · xrp
...
...
...
...
ynl xnl1 · · · xnlm · · · xnlp

w=l
=

y1 ~x1
...
...
yr ~xr
...
...
ynl ~xnl

w=l
where nl denotes the number of refugees for whom wr = l.
(b) Using the data in Tl (the outcome yr and feature vector ~xr for all nl refugees
in Tl), model and estimate the function θˆl(~xr).
3. Designate the data on new refugee arrivals and denote them by the matrix R:
R =

x˙11 · · · x˙1m · · · x˙1p
...
...
...
x˙r1 · · · x˙rm · · · x˙rp
...
...
...
x˙nR1 · · · x˙nRm · · · x˙nRp
 =

~˙x1
...
~˙xr
...
~˙xnR

where nR denotes the number of new refugee arrivals.
The matrix R corresponds to the 2016 Q3 refugees in this application.
4. For all refugees in R and all resettlement locations, estimate P (y˙r = 1|~˙xr, w˙r = l)
as follows.
For r = 1, ..., nR:
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For l = 1, ..., k:
Estimate P (y˙r = 1|~˙xr, w˙r = l) by applying lth model in Θ to ~˙xr:
P̂ (y˙r = 1|~˙xr, w˙r = l) = θˆl(~˙xr) ≡ pirl
Arrange the pirl into a vector, ~pir = [pir1, ..., pirk].
5. Produce a matrix of predicted probabilities, with rows corresponding to new
refugees and columns corresponding to resettlement locations, as follows.
Arrange vectors ~pir into rows of the matrix M:
M =

~pi1
...
~pir
...
~pinR
 =

pi11 · · · pi1l · · · pi1k
...
...
...
pir1 · · · pirl · · · pirk
...
...
...
pinR1 · · · pinRl · · · pinRk

This is the final modeling stage output.
We follow Bansak et al. (2018) and use boosted trees (Friedman et al., 2009, Fried-
man, 2001) to estimate θˆl(~xr) in step 2(b). See Bansak et al. (2018) for more details on
the selection criteria and model performance metrics leading to the choice of boosted
trees. Specifically, we use stochastic gradient boosted trees (bag fraction of 0.5) with
a binomial deviance loss function (Friedman, 2002, Friedman et al., 2009), which we
implemented in R using the gbm package (Ridgeway, 2017). Tuning parameter values,
including the interaction depth, learning rate, and number of boosting iterations (the
early stopping point) are selected via cross-validation within the training data for each
location-specific model.
We use the following predictors: Free case, Speaks English, Age at arrival, Male,
Education (ordered variable differentiating between no/unknown education, less than
secondary, secondary, technical/professional, and university), Country of origin (one
binary variable for each of the largest origin groups including Burma, Iraq, Bhutan,
Somalia, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Eritrea, Ukraine, Syria,
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Moldova), Year of arrival, and Month of arrival.
D.7 Mapping to Case-Level
Since the assignment of refugees typically takes place at the level of the case (typically
a family), we need to map the refugee-level predicted probabilities from the modeling
process to a case-level metric. For each case-location pair, we apply the mapping function
to the refugee-location predicted probabilities for all refugees belonging to that case,
yielding a single value for that case-location pair. This results in a new matrix (M∗
matrix) with the same number of columns (locations) as previously but now as many
rows as cases rather than refugees.
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Formally, let i = 1, ..., n denote the refugee case, with a total of n cases, where
n ≤ nR. The mapping process then proceeds as follows:
1. Perform mapping of individual predicted probabilities to case-level metric as fol-
lows.
For i = 1, ..., n:
For l = 1, ..., k:
Let p˜iil = {pirl ∀ r ∈ i}. (That is, p˜iil is the set of all pirl for the lth
location and refugees belonging to the ith case.)
Compute γil = ψ(p˜iil) where ψ is a predetermined mapping function.
Arrange the γil into a vector, ~γi = [γi1, ..., γik].
2. Produce a matrix containing the case-level metric for all case-location pairs, with
rows corresponding to cases and columns corresponding to resettlement locations,
as follows.
Arrange vectors ~γi produced in step 1 into rows of the matrix M
∗:
M∗ =

~γ1
...
~γi
...
~γn
 =

γ11 · · · γ1l · · · γ1k
...
...
...
γi1 · · · γil · · · γik
...
...
...
γn1 · · · γnl · · · γnk

This is the final mapping stage output.
In step 1, the function ψ must be specified. In our application, we employ the mean
for both the predicted probabilities of employment and the predicted probabilities of
outmigration (see Bansak et al. (2018) for alternative choices).
D.8 Final Construction of Outcome Scores and Preference Ranks
The M∗ matrix pertaining to the predicted probabilities of employment directly provides
the outcome scores for use in the mechanism. However, the M∗ matrix pertaining to
the predicted probabilities of outmigration must be further transformed to provide the
(inferred) preference ranks. Specifically, for each row (case), we rank locations such that
the location with the lowest (highest) average probability of outmigration is ranked first
(last), producing a preference rank vector for each case.
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E Education Application
E.1 Background Information on Application
Here we illustrate our mechanism by applying them to a hypothetical example of choice
of elementary schools. We consider a case where a school district might be interested
to assign incoming Kindergarten students to elementary schools in the district with the
goal to maximize academic achievement as measured by scores on standardized tests that
are administered at the end of the Kindergarten grade. Students have preferences over
schools and so the goal of the mechanism is to optimize on test scores and preferences
subject to the minimum expected average level of test score set by the district.
E.2 Tennesse Star Data
We leverage data from the Tennessee’s Student Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR)
project conducted by the Tennessee State Department of Education. This data include
student level data on from a longitudinal experiment in Tennessee that began in 1985
and tracked a cohort of students progressing from kindergarten through third grade (for
details on the data and sample see Achilles et al. (2008)). The data includes demographic
information on the students, indicators for the schools that they attended, as well as
information on achievement tests that were administered annually at the end of each
grade. We focus on the sample of 1,674 students from 33 schools that are observed for all
grades from Kindergarten through 3rd grade and have non-missing data for tests scores
and background characteristics.
Table S2 shows the descriptive statistics for our sample. Below is a list of variables
and measures used:
• Month of birth: This variable is coded with values from 1 to 12.
• Year of birth: This variable is coded with values including 1978, 1979, 1980, and
1981
• Race: The student’s race coded as six categories including White, Black, Asian,
Hispanic, Native American, and Other.
• Free lunch: Binary variable coded as 1 if the student was eligible for free/reduced
lunch in Kindergarten and zero otherwise.
• Special Education: Binary variable coded as 1 if the student was eligible for special
education status in Kindergarten and zero otherwise.
• Female: Binary variable coded as 1 for female students and zero otherwise
• SAT Score Reading : Total reading scaled score on the Stanford Achievement Test
at the end of Kindergarten.
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• SAT Score Math: Total math scaled score on the Stanford Achievement Test at
the end of Kindergarten.
• SAT Score Listening : Total listening scaled score on the Stanford Achievement
Test at the end of Kindergarten.
• Sum of SAT Scores : Sum of the three SAT scores for Reading, Math, and Total
listening scaled score at the end of Kindergarten.
• Left Kindergarten: Variable used to measure outmigration from the Kindergarten
school. Higher values indicate that the student left the Kindergarten school faster
which can be interpreted as a stronger preference for another school. Coded 0 if
student remained in the Kindergarten school for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd grade; coded 1
if student stay in Kindergarten school for grade 1 and 2 but left for another school
for grade 3; coded 2 if student stay in Kindergarten school for grade 1, but left
for another school for grade 2; and coded 3 if students left for another school for
grade 1.
E.3 Applying the Mechanism
To generate each student’s outcome score vector across each of the schools, we used the
same stochastic gradient boosted tree models as in the refugee application to predict the
expected tests score of a student at any of the schools, as a function of their background
characteristics. The background characteristics included the students’ age, gender, race,
as well as information on whether they are eligible for free school lunches (a proxy
for socioeconomic status) or special education. The test score outcome was defined as
the sum of reading, math, and listening scaled SAT scores for the Kindergarten level.
Given the small sample size for some schools we used the same data for the training
and validation set and increased the bag fraction to 1. We look for the best fitting tree
models over interactions depth of 3 to 8 using 5-fold cross-validation with total of 1,500
trees.
To generate the school preferences we inferred revealed school preferences of students
from the observed transfers out of the schools. Specifically, we used the same modeling
procedure of stochastic gradient boosted tree model as for the test scores but instead
used a response variable that measured whether a student had transferred to another
school by the first, second, or third grade. Based on these models we can then predict
for each student the propensity for leaving each school as a function of their background
characteristics. For each student, we then rank schools such that the school with the
lowest (highest) propensity for transferring out is ranked first (last). In contrast to the
refugee application there is no mapping to a case level since assignments are done at
the student level. We impose the constraint that every school can only receive as many
students as the did in actuality.
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F Tables
Table S1: Descriptive Statistics for United States Refugee Sample
Mean SD
Male 0.53 0.50
Speaks English 0.42 0.49
Age:
18-29 0.44 0.50
30-39 0.28 0.45
40-49 0.16 0.37
50+ 0.11 0.31
Education:
None/Unknown 0.18 0.39
Less than Secondary 0.39 0.49
Secondary 0.21 0.41
Advanced 0.10 0.30
University 0.12 0.33
Origin:
Burma 0.23 0.42
Iraq 0.20 0.40
Bhutan 0.13 0.34
Somalia 0.11 0.31
Afghanistan 0.07 0.25
Other 0.26 0.44
Employed 0.23 0.42
Sample consists of refugees of working age that were
resettled by one of the largest resettlement agencies and
arrived in the period from quarter 1, 2011 to quarter
3, 2016. N = 33,782.
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Table S2: Descriptive Statistics for Student Sample
Mean SD
Month of birth 6.22 3.45
Year of birth 1979.74 0.45
Race:
White 0.82 0.38
Black 0.17 0.38
Asian 0.00 0.05
Hispanic 0.00 0.02
Native American 0.00 0.00
Other 0.00 0.03
Free lunch 0.34 0.47
Special Education 0.02 0.13
Female 0.51 0.50
SAT Score Reading 445.34 31.17
SAT Score Math 499.43 43.41
SAT Score Listening 547.18 30.38
Sum of SAT Scores 1491.95 88.22
Left Kindergarten 0.06 0.37
Sample consists of students from the Tennessee Star
data. N = 1,674.
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Figure S1: Results from applying our g-Constrained Priority Mechanism to simulated
data (without truncated preferences) that varies the correlations between location pref-
erence and integration outcome vectors and the correlations between preference vectors
across families. This figure shows the results of the same simulations as in the main text
Figure 1, except that the simulated families’ preference rank vectors were not truncated
in the simulations illustrated here. Upper panel shows the average probability that a
family was assigned to one of its top three locations. Lower panel shows the realized
average integration outcomes, i.e. the average projected probability of employment.
N = 100.
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Figure S2: Results of applying our g-Constrained Priority Mechanism to refugee families
in the United States (without truncated preferences) for various specified thresholds for
the expected minimum level of average integration outcomes (g). This figure shows
the results of applying the mechanism to the same data as in the main text Figure 3,
except that the families’ preference rank vectors were not truncated in the application
illustrated here. Upper panel shows the average probability that a refugee got assigned
to one of their top three locations. Lower panel shows the realized average integration
outcomes, i.e. the average projected probability of employment. N = 561 families who
arrived in Q3 of 2016.
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Figure S3: Results from re-running simulations discussed in Section 4.1, where at each
level of g, the mechanism is applied 100 separate times and the order of the agents is re-
randomized each time. The dots denote the results—the proportion assigned to a top-3
location in the panels on the left, and the mean outcome score on the right—averaged
across the 100 re-orderings, and the intervals denote the maximum and minimum results
obtained across the 100 re-orderings.
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